Big Tech vs. The FTC — Can We Stop the Finger Pointing and Start Co-Creating?As the FTC takes Meta to court in a landmark antitrust case that could lead to the divestment of Instagram and WhatsApp, we’re all watching to see if this reshapes the digital world as we know it.
I’ve spent my career in media, much of it within government, so when it comes to governance, it's all very much the same routes! — and while this isn’t my industry per se, I couldn’t help but rabbit-hole into it.
I was actually chatting with ChatGPT- It started as a curiosity… and spiralled into challenging current ideas and exploring all sides, reaching into a bigger thought:
💡 What if the real solution isn’t just breaking companies apart, but building better mechanisms together?
Instead of reactive regulation and endless court battles, what if the FTC and Big Tech co-developed a standardized monitoring mechanism?
✅ Transparent
✅ Built collaboratively by platforms and regulators
✅ Tracks algorithmic boosts, ad pricing fairness, and content visibility
✅ Designed to evolve as tech does
The truth is:
* Startups will still want to sell — you can’t stop that.
* Big players will still aim to enhance and grow — that’s business.
* But unchecked dominance and internal data monopolies can harm innovation and trust.
So why not create a Digital Transparency Board — a living system of standards, shared metrics, and mutual accountability that everyone agrees to?
This thought came from linking dots between things that feel disassociated, but actually affect us all.
👉 If you’re in tech, policy, digital ethics, or media, has anything like this been explored already? Could it work?
Would love your thoughts. And if it resonates, pass it on.
Meta (META.O)
CEO Mark Zuckerberg considered spinning off popular photo-sharing app Instagram in 2018 over concerns about the growing risk of antitrust scrutiny, according to a document shown at a trial in Washington on Tuesday.
The document was shown during Zuckerberg's second day of testimony at the high-stakes trial, in which the U.S. Federal Trade Commission is seeking to unwind Meta's acquisitions of prized assets Instagram and WhatsApp.
"I wonder if we should consider the extreme step of spinning Instagram out as a separate company," Zuckerberg said in the memo. At the time, the company was mulling plans to reorganize the social media company and link its apps together more closely.
Zuckerberg pushed back in the memo, saying consolidation was likely to yield "strong business growth" but cautioning that it also could erode the value of flagship app Facebook's social network, with scant promise that the company would get to keep its full "family of apps" in the end.
Meta ultimately did not spin off Instagram, instead proceeding with the plan to integrate its apps the following year. But the fact that Zuckerberg even considered the idea is a stunning sign of how seriously he took the threat of precisely the type of antitrust trial proceeding now.
"As calls to break up the big tech companies grow, there is a non-trivial chance that we will be forced to spin out Instagram and perhaps WhatsApp in the next 5-10 years anyway," he wrote then, noting the possibility that the "next Democratic president" could take action to break up tech companies.
"This is one more factor that we should consider since even if we wanted to keep those apps together, we may not be able to," he said.
The FTC ultimately sued Meta in 2020, during President Donald Trump's first term. Trump's antitrust enforcers sued Alphabet's (GOOGL.O) Google the same year, accusing it of monopolizing search.
Zuckerberg also downplayed the impact of a spinoff on the company's fortunes at the time in his memo, although Meta has argued publicly since then that attempts to break it up would be damaging.
"While most companies resist breakups, the corporate history is that most companies actually perform better after they've been split up. The synergies are usually less than people think and the strategy tax is usually greater than people think," he wrote.
'INSTAGRAM WAS BETTER'
Zuckerberg's testimony comes as Meta is defending itself years after the release of other damning statements plucked from Facebook's own documents, like a 2008 email in which he said "it is better to buy than compete."
The FTC accuses Meta of holding a monopoly on platforms used to share content with friends and family, where its main competitors in the United States are Snap's (SNAP.N) Snapchat, and MeWe, a tiny privacy-focused social media app launched in 2016.
Platforms where users broadcast content to strangers based on shared interests, such as X, TikTok, YouTube, and Reddit (RDDT.N), are not interchangeable, the FTC argues.
The case is widely seen as a test of the new Trump administration's promises to take on Big Tech companies.
Zuckerberg testified earlier in the day that Meta bought Instagram because it had a "better" camera than the one his company was trying to build at the time.
The acknowledgement likewise appeared to support allegations by the FTC that Meta had used a "buy or bury" strategy to snap up potential rivals, keep smaller competitors at bay, and maintain an illegal monopoly.
Asked by an attorney for the FTC whether he thought fast-growing Instagram could be destructive to Meta, then known as Facebook, Zuckerberg said he believed Instagram had a better camera than the one his company was building.
"We were doing a build vs. buy analysis" while in the process of building a camera app, Zuckerberg said. "I thought that Instagram was better at that, so I thought it was better to buy them."
The company argues that his past intentions are irrelevant because the FTC has defined the social media market inaccurately and failed to account for stiff competition Meta has faced from ByteDance's TikTok, Alphabet's YouTube, and Apple's (AAPL.O) messaging app.
Zuckerberg also acknowledged that many of the company's attempts at building its own apps had failed.
"Building a new app is hard, and many more times than not, when we have tried to build a new app, it hasn't gotten a lot of traction," Zuckerberg told the court.
"We probably tried building dozens of apps over the history of the compan,y and the majority of them don't go anywhere," he said.
Users have complained for years that Instagram lost its way as it prioritized creators. That sounds close to home, doesn't it?
Emails revealed during this week’s antitrust trial shed light on internal debates at Meta (formerly Facebook) about Instagram’s direction dating back to 2018. In one exchange, Instagram head Adam Mosseri recapped a conversation with CEO Mark Zuckerberg, in which Zuckerberg said it would be good for Instagram to compete more with YouTube.
Mosseri agreed but clarified in a follow-up email that he didn’t mean Instagram should shift focus away from friends. “If Instagram were to focus on influencers and interests and not on friends, then you should know I think that’s a mistake,” he wrote.
Zuckerberg responded that he believed Instagram should put more emphasis on public figures to better compete with YouTube, but acknowledged the tradeoff. “There’s only so much focus to go around,” he wrote. “But overall, I agree… Instagram will always need to focus on friends and can never exclusively be for public figures, or it will cease to be a social product.”
The exchange underscores a longstanding tension at Meta: how to court online creators and influencers while preserving the friends-based experience that made Instagram popular.
One solution the company has considered is spinning off features like Reels into separate apps. As reported earlier this year, this could allow Instagram to pursue TikTok-style content more aggressively while keeping its core social network centered on real-life connections.
Perhaps the most striking revelation so far from the trial: internal FTC documents show that Zuckerberg once floated the idea of spinning off Instagram entirely. His reasoning? A concern that regulators might force a breakup and that Instagram’s rapid growth could undercut Facebook’s dominance.
Well, that may very well happen, and perhaps it should. It's a covered, often rarely debated topic for me, but as the details emerge and my own involvement and advisor role in an upcoming professional network, I'm listening.
Emails revealed during this week’s antitrust trial shed light on internal debates at Meta (formerly Facebook) about Instagram’s direction dating back to 2018. In one exchange, Instagram head Adam Mosseri recapped a conversation with CEO Mark Zuckerberg, in which Zuckerberg said it would be good for Instagram to compete more with YouTube.
Mosseri agreed but clarified in a follow-up email that he didn’t mean Instagram should shift focus away from friends. “If Instagram were to focus on influencers and interests and not on friends, then you should know I think that’s a mistake,” he wrote.
Zuckerberg responded that he believed Instagram should put more emphasis on public figures to better compete with YouTube, but acknowledged the tradeoff. “There’s only so much focus to go around,” he wrote. “But overall, I agree… Instagram will always need to focus on friends and can never exclusively be for public figures, or it will cease to be a social product.”
The exchange underscores a longstanding tension at Meta: how to court online creators and influencers while preserving the friends-based experience that made Instagram popular.
One solution the company has considered is spinning off features like Reels into separate apps. As reported earlier this year, this could allow Instagram to pursue TikTok-style content more aggressively while keeping its core social network centered on real-life connections.
Perhaps the most striking revelation so far from the trial: internal FTC documents show that Zuckerberg once floated the idea of spinning off Instagram entirely. His reasoning? A concern that regulators might force a breakup and that Instagram’s rapid growth could undercut Facebook’s dominance.
Well, that may very well happen, and perhaps it should. It's a covered, often rarely debated topic for me, but as the details emerge and my own involvement and advisor role in an upcoming professional network, I'm listening.
Meta on Trial: A Defining Moment for Antitrust Enforcement in the Digital Age
The FTC's landmark antitrust trial against Meta is more than just a courtroom drama; it's a pivotal moment that will shape the future of competition in the digital economy. At its core, the case questions whether Meta, through its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, unlawfully stifled innovation and cemented its dominance by eliminating potential rivals. The outcome will reverberate across the tech industry, influencing how future mergers and acquisitions are scrutinized and potentially reshaping the landscape of social media.
The FTC's central argument is that Meta chose to "buy, not build", which strikes at the heart of antitrust principles. The allegation, supported by internal communications attributed to Mark Zuckerberg, suggests a deliberate strategy to neutralize emerging competitors rather than engaging in organic competition. If proven, this could establish a precedent for future cases involving acquisitions of nascent companies, forcing tech giants to demonstrate that such deals genuinely enhance competition and benefit consumers, not simply eliminate potential threats.
Meta's defense, centered on the claim that the acquisitions improved the acquired services and that it faces robust competition, highlights the complexities of defining market dominance in the rapidly evolving tech sector. The company argues that Instagram and WhatsApp flourished under Meta's umbrella, benefiting from increased investment and innovation. However, the FTC likely aims to demonstrate that these services would have been even more innovative and beneficial to consumers had they remained independent competitors, a difficult but crucial point to prove.
The backdrop of Zuckerberg's past lobbying efforts and the evolving political landscape within the FTC adds another layer of intrigue to the trial. While the legal merits of the case remain paramount, the political context cannot be ignored, potentially influencing the agency's enforcement priorities and the court's overall perception of Meta's conduct. This underscores the inherent intersection of law, politics, and economics in antitrust litigation, particularly when dealing with powerful and influential corporations.
The anticipated "uphill battle" for the FTC reflects the challenges of proving anticompetitive effects in dynamic markets. Unlike traditional industries, the tech sector is characterized by rapid innovation, network effects, and the emergence of disruptive technologies. Demonstrating that Meta's acquisitions demonstrably harmed consumers by suppressing innovation or raising prices requires a nuanced understanding of these market dynamics and a compelling presentation of economic evidence.
The FTC's landmark antitrust trial against Meta is more than just a courtroom drama; it's a pivotal moment that will shape the future of competition in the digital economy. At its core, the case questions whether Meta, through its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, unlawfully stifled innovation and cemented its dominance by eliminating potential rivals. The outcome will reverberate across the tech industry, influencing how future mergers and acquisitions are scrutinized and potentially reshaping the landscape of social media.
The FTC's central argument is that Meta chose to "buy, not build", which strikes at the heart of antitrust principles. The allegation, supported by internal communications attributed to Mark Zuckerberg, suggests a deliberate strategy to neutralize emerging competitors rather than engaging in organic competition. If proven, this could establish a precedent for future cases involving acquisitions of nascent companies, forcing tech giants to demonstrate that such deals genuinely enhance competition and benefit consumers, not simply eliminate potential threats.
Meta's defense, centered on the claim that the acquisitions improved the acquired services and that it faces robust competition, highlights the complexities of defining market dominance in the rapidly evolving tech sector. The company argues that Instagram and WhatsApp flourished under Meta's umbrella, benefiting from increased investment and innovation. However, the FTC likely aims to demonstrate that these services would have been even more innovative and beneficial to consumers had they remained independent competitors, a difficult but crucial point to prove.
The backdrop of Zuckerberg's past lobbying efforts and the evolving political landscape within the FTC adds another layer of intrigue to the trial. While the legal merits of the case remain paramount, the political context cannot be ignored, potentially influencing the agency's enforcement priorities and the court's overall perception of Meta's conduct. This underscores the inherent intersection of law, politics, and economics in antitrust litigation, particularly when dealing with powerful and influential corporations.
The anticipated "uphill battle" for the FTC reflects the challenges of proving anticompetitive effects in dynamic markets. Unlike traditional industries, the tech sector is characterized by rapid innovation, network effects, and the emergence of disruptive technologies. Demonstrating that Meta's acquisitions demonstrably harmed consumers by suppressing innovation or raising prices requires a nuanced understanding of these market dynamics and a compelling presentation of economic evidence.
Meta’s antitrust trial starts today. If Meta is forced to sell Instagram and WhatsApp, that would have major ramifications for the company and the social media landscape.
Here’s what’s at stake for Meta:
𝗠𝗲𝘁𝗮 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝗹𝗼𝘀𝗲 𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵𝗹𝘆 𝗵𝗮𝗹𝗳 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗱 𝗯𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗦, 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗺𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝗹𝘂𝗰𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘁. EMARKETER expects Instagram to account for 50.5% of Meta’s US ad revenues in 2025. Worldwide, Facebook still generates more ad revenue than Instagram, but Meta still stands to lose over a third of its total ad business and its biggest revenue growth driver.
𝗜𝘁 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝘀𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗹𝘆 𝗱𝗮𝗺𝗮𝗴𝗲 𝗠𝗲𝘁𝗮’𝘀 𝗳𝘂𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗴𝗿𝗼𝘄𝘁𝗵 𝗽𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗹. Instagram has been picking up Meta’s slack for a long time on the user front, especially among young people. Meta’s efforts to bring back “OG Facebook” are a clear indication of how much Meta needs Gen Z and younger consumers as they join social platforms in order to keep growing.
𝗠𝗲𝘁𝗮 𝘄𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱𝗻’𝘁 𝗹𝗼𝘀𝗲 𝗺𝘂𝗰𝗵 𝗺𝗼𝗻𝗲𝘆 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗮 𝘀𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗼𝗳𝗳 𝗼𝗳 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁𝘀𝗔𝗽𝗽. But the messaging app provides it with reach and some data that it can use to support its ad business. WhatsApp has also become a bigger priority for Meta lately, as it seeks to build out business messaging and diversify its revenue streams.
The big picture:
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗼𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗽𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗿 𝗺𝗼𝗿𝗲 𝗳𝗿𝗮𝗴𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼𝗱𝗮𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝗻 𝗶𝘁 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮. When Facebook acquired Instagram, only half of the US population used social networks. Snapchat had only just launched, and TikTok didn’t exist. In 2025, Facebook remains the biggest social platform worldwide, but people now use a much more diverse range of social platforms - and for far more than just "personal social networking."
𝗕𝘂𝘁 𝘀𝗼𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗮𝗱 𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝘀 𝗵𝗲𝗮𝘃𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝗠𝗲𝘁𝗮. In 2025, Meta will account for 72.5% of US social ad spending, up from 64.8% in 2012. While Meta also competes with other major tech players, particularly Amazon and Google, it has a stronghold on social ad budgets. That’s largely because of its scale and the ability for advertisers to easily place ads across multiple platforms, which the outcome of the trial could upend.
Here’s what’s at stake for Meta:
𝗠𝗲𝘁𝗮 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝗹𝗼𝘀𝗲 𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵𝗹𝘆 𝗵𝗮𝗹𝗳 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗱 𝗯𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗦, 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗺𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝗹𝘂𝗰𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘁. EMARKETER expects Instagram to account for 50.5% of Meta’s US ad revenues in 2025. Worldwide, Facebook still generates more ad revenue than Instagram, but Meta still stands to lose over a third of its total ad business and its biggest revenue growth driver.
𝗜𝘁 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝘀𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗹𝘆 𝗱𝗮𝗺𝗮𝗴𝗲 𝗠𝗲𝘁𝗮’𝘀 𝗳𝘂𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗴𝗿𝗼𝘄𝘁𝗵 𝗽𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗹. Instagram has been picking up Meta’s slack for a long time on the user front, especially among young people. Meta’s efforts to bring back “OG Facebook” are a clear indication of how much Meta needs Gen Z and younger consumers as they join social platforms in order to keep growing.
𝗠𝗲𝘁𝗮 𝘄𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱𝗻’𝘁 𝗹𝗼𝘀𝗲 𝗺𝘂𝗰𝗵 𝗺𝗼𝗻𝗲𝘆 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗮 𝘀𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗼𝗳𝗳 𝗼𝗳 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁𝘀𝗔𝗽𝗽. But the messaging app provides it with reach and some data that it can use to support its ad business. WhatsApp has also become a bigger priority for Meta lately, as it seeks to build out business messaging and diversify its revenue streams.
The big picture:
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗼𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗽𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗿 𝗺𝗼𝗿𝗲 𝗳𝗿𝗮𝗴𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼𝗱𝗮𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝗻 𝗶𝘁 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮. When Facebook acquired Instagram, only half of the US population used social networks. Snapchat had only just launched, and TikTok didn’t exist. In 2025, Facebook remains the biggest social platform worldwide, but people now use a much more diverse range of social platforms - and for far more than just "personal social networking."
𝗕𝘂𝘁 𝘀𝗼𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗮𝗱 𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝘀 𝗵𝗲𝗮𝘃𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝗠𝗲𝘁𝗮. In 2025, Meta will account for 72.5% of US social ad spending, up from 64.8% in 2012. While Meta also competes with other major tech players, particularly Amazon and Google, it has a stronghold on social ad budgets. That’s largely because of its scale and the ability for advertisers to easily place ads across multiple platforms, which the outcome of the trial could upend.